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Cohen begins by defining ‘Color Physicalism’ so that the position is incompatible
with Color Relationalism (unlike Byrne and Hilbert 2003, 7, and note 18). Phys-
icalism, in any event, is something of a distraction, since Cohen’s argument from
perceptual variation is directed against 
 
any
 
 view on which minor color misper-
ception is common (Byrne and Hilbert 2004). A typical color primitivist, for
example, is equally vulnerable to the argument.
Suppose that normal human observers S1 and S2 are viewing a chip C, as in
Cohen’s example. C looks unique green to S1, and bluish green to S2. The
problem, as Cohen has it,  is to explain ‘what could (metaphysically) make it
the case’ that S1, say, and not S2, perceive C correctly. He purports to find the
explanation ‘extremely hard to imagine’, and so concludes that 
 
both
 
 S1 and S2
perceive C correctly. (That is not the only option, of course: Hardin concludes
that 
 
neither
 
 perceives the chip correctly.)
However, 
 
pace
 
 Cohen, the explanation seems extremely 
 
easy
 
 to imagine.
Presumably Cohen does not think that it is mysterious why S1 is representing C
differently from S2. It 
 
would
 
 be mysterious if S1 and S2 were in the same brain
states, but they aren’t: S1 and S2 differ in many ways relevant to the representation
of colors.
On the side of C, presumably Cohen is not puzzled about what could ‘make
it the case’ that the chip is one color rather than another. That 
 
would
 
 be puzzling
if the chip didn’t interact with light (for example), but it does: it is a commonplace
opaque uniform chip.
So, putting the two together, what ‘makes it the case’ that S1, not S2, is
perceiving C correctly, is that S1 is representing C as being unique green, S2 is
representing C as being bluish green (no problem so far), and C 
 
is
 
 unique green,
not bluish green (likewise, no problem).
Cohen’s objection to this sequence of three steps must come at the third, where
facts about representation and the color of the chip are purportedly conjoined.
What could the objection be? A clue can be found in his note 7, where he compares
the color case to disagreement about whether a joke is humorous. Combining the
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unique green chip with the appearance of bluish green is rather like, Cohen thinks,
combining a humorous joke with complete lack of laughter in a normal well-
informed (etc.) listener. If the latter combination is possible, then the mispercep-
tion of humor by normal subjects is possible, which – let us pretend for the sake
of the argument – is absurd.
If this diagnosis is right, then in order for the argument from variation to work,
Cohen needs to 
 
assume
 
 that color misperception by normal observers (in normal
conditions) is impossible – and so S1 and S2 perceive C correctly. But since this
is the argument’s 
 
conclusion
 
, the question has been completely begged.
It is not clear to me whether Mizrahi’s understanding of the argument from
variation is the same as Cohen’s. There is some indication that she thinks it raises
an epistemological difficulty, as opposed to Cohen, who stresses that the problem
is metaphysical. She remarks that ‘Byrne & Hilbert seem to agree with Hardin
that color realism needs an independent standard that would determine which chip,
if any, is unique green’. If an ‘independent standard’ does not afford a 
 
way of
telling
 
 which chip is unique green, then we do agree. The independent standard
is  simply  given  by  the  color  (reflectance/productance,  in  our  story,  although
that is incidental) of the chip. However, Mizrahi then goes on to say that we
‘acknowledge’ that there is a ‘problem’, namely ‘there is no such 
 
knowable
 
standard’ (my emphasis). But we do not acknowledge that this is a problem at all.
Why would it be? (See Byrne and Hilbert 2004.)
Mizrahi’s own view is closer to Byrne and Hilbert’s than she realizes. Accord-
ing to Mizrahi, colors are ‘dispositions for a surface to reflect a determinate
proportion of any incident light L’. (Some other parts of Mizrahi’s paper suggest
a more complicated account, which I shall pass over for lack of space.) Thus, the
disposition of a surface to reflect 70% of 680 nm spectral light is a color, according
to Mizrahi. She seems to think we disagree, but we don’t. That disposition is a
color because it is a reflectance type, specifically the disjunction of all SSRs that
pair 680 nm with 70%. It is, however, not a color that the human visual system
is in the business of detecting. Mizrahi departs from us, not on the nature of color,
but on this 
 
last
 
 point – according to Mizrahi, the range of humanly detectible
colors is enormously 
 
greater
 
 than is commonly supposed. (In this, she agrees with
Cohen.) When a banana ‘looks red’ in 680 nm light, Mizrahi thinks, the banana
does not appear to have a property that tomatoes in daylight 
 
also
 
 appear to have
– the two colors are ‘essentially different’. She is therefore vulnerable to a variant
of the objection to relationalists that she cites earlier (Byrne and Hilbert 2003,
58). And in any case, she motivates her ingenious positive proposal solely by
appeal to the misbegotten argument from variation.
Maund thinks that when one sees a tomato, the tomato is represented as being
red (a ‘phenomenological quality’). The tomato, according to Maund, is not red.
One’s experience does have a ‘phenomenal quality’ – a quale, of the full-bodied
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Australian Shiraz variety. This phenomenal quality ‘is construed as an objective
quality of a physical body’ (the tomato). The phenomenal quality is ‘part of the
representational content’, by which Maund seems to mean that the experience
represents the tomato as having the phenomenal quality – see his remark about
Goodman and representation by exemplification. But then the distinction between
phenomenological and phenomenal qualities collapses: in the case of the tomato,
redness 
 
=
 
 the phenomenological quality (a merely apparent quality of the tomato)
 
=
 
 the phenomenal quality (a genuine quality of the experience). Suppose I see a
tomato next to a cucumber. On Maund’s view, it would appear to follow that my
experience is both red and green – an interesting result, no doubt.
Maund’s argument for the illusory theory is that science has shown that there
are ‘no properties that both play the right causal roles, in the perception of colour,
and which satisfy the structural principles [about similarities], (nor that have the
right sensuous, qualitative character)’. In his paper, at any rate, he does not explain
why we are supposed to think that science has shown these things. Partly under
the prodding of philosophers like Maund, Hilbert and I have tried to dispel any
conflict between red tomatoes and the deliverances of science (Byrne and Hilbert
2003; see also Hilbert 1987 and Byrne 2003). Perhaps we are wrong, but Maund
does not address our arguments.
If science has shown that tomatoes aren’t red, hasn’t it also shown that
 
experiences
 
 do not have phenomenal qualities, properties with ‘the right sensuous,
qualitative character’? Neuroscience has not yet turned up anything sensuous, as
far as I know. Maund might reply that science has merely shown that if experi-
ences have phenomenal qualities, then these qualities are non-physical. It would
then be consistent for him to insist that experiences do have (non-physical)
phenomenal qualities. But if that reply is acceptable, what’s to stop the analogous
move, made on behalf of color primitivism? Tomatoes 
 
are
 
 red, but redness is not
a physical property. (See Byrne and Hilbert forthcoming.) There is a danger that
Maund’s attempt to preserve his account of color experience will end up spoiling
his argument for the illusory theory.
Levine grants the premises of my paper in this volume (or at least is prepared
to try them on for size), but denies my conclusion. The color-body problem, he
claims, is just the old wine of the mind-body problem in a shiny new bottle,
because ‘color is essentially a mental phenomenon’. As he nicely puts it: ‘The
“qualia freak” is right in seeing colors and sounds as grounded in the nature of
conscious experience, but wrong in thinking that this demands that they be thought
of as intrinsic properties of experience. The representationalist is right in insisting
on transparency, but wrong in thinking that this therefore entitles her to treat
secondary qualities as extra-mental’.
Why is color a ‘mental phenomenon’? After refusing assistance from the
sense-datum theory, Levine suggests that redness is ‘a disposition to enter into
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[the primitive relation of looking-red] with a conscious viewer’. Levine empha-
sizes that ‘x looks red to S’ is not supposed to be understood in terms of x’s
causing S’s ‘sensory state [to possess] a certain qualitative character’, but is
instead ‘intentional’: when x looks red to S, x is 
 
represented
 
 to be red. The account
of redness as a disposition to look red is therefore 
 
nonreductive
 
 (Byrne and Hilbert
1997, xxi) – ‘red’ appears in the analysandum. (For a similar view, see McDowell
1985.)
I do not think this account of color serves Levine’s purposes. Rather than
resurrecting the 
 
mind
 
-body problem, Levine’s proposal, if correct, dissolves the
 
color
 
-body problem. There is no problem explaining how a physical lemon can
be disposed to 
 
look
 
 yellow, so, granted Levine’s nonreductive dispositionalism,
there is no problem explaining how a physical lemon can 
 
be
 
 yellow – and thus
the color-body problem vanishes. What I don’t see is why, given Levine’s con-
cessions about transparency, any residue of the mind-body problem remains.*
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* Thanks to David Hilbert for discussion.
